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Abstract: This paper examines the determinants of exchange rate regime of a country. 
A competing risks model (CRM) is estimated. It is found that the way a country exits 
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1. Introduction 
        
A number of countries have abandoned the fixed exchange rate regime and adopted a 
relatively floating exchange rate arrangement following the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system. Some of these countries (for example, Japan and Israel) managed to 
switch to a floating regime without triggering a currency crisis. However, for most 
countries, the transitions have seldom been smooth. Eichengreen (1999) argues that 
exits from a pegged exchange rate system have rarely occurred under favourable 
circumstances. For example, in the cases of Mexico, Thailand and Argentina, the exits 
were triggered by speculative attacks. A number of studies have developed models on 
the optimal timing of switching the exchange rate regime (Krugman, 1979; Flood and 
Garber, 1984; Rebelo and Vegh, 2008). It has been well documented that the duration 
of the peg plays an important role in the decision to exit the fixed exchange rate 
regime. For example, Klein and Marion (1997) show that the longer a peg lasts, the 
more likely it is to collapse. Walti (2005) finds a non-monotonic relationship between 
the peg duration and the probability of its collapse. Masson and Ruge-Murcia (2005) 
study the transition between exchange rate regimes using a Markov chain model with 
time-varying transition probabilities. Klein and Shambaugh (2006) also show that peg 
duration affects the collapse of an exchange rate regime. Tamgac (2013) finds non-
monotonic duration dependence of fixed exchange rate regimes in emerging 
economies.  
 
The aforementioned studies, however, rarely distinguish different modes of exits. This 
paper examines the relationship between the duration and the modes of leaving a 
fixed exchange rate system. Pertinent research in this area is rather limited. A related 
study conducted by Duttagupta and Otker-Robe (2003) concludes that peg duration 
significantly affects the modes of exits. However, their models suffer from the 
problem of survivorship bias. In this paper, we apply the competing risks model to 
assess the impact of a peg duration and different time dependent variables on the odds 
of different exits. The competing risks model (CRM) has wide economic applications. 
For example, He et al. (2010) apply the model to study the delisting behaviour of 
public firms, and D’Addio and Rosholm (2005) estimate a CRM for exits from 
temporary jobs in Europe. We will use the CRM model to distinguish the 
characteristics of successful transitions (orderly exits) from the failures (crisis-driven 
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exits). It is found that crisis-driven exits exhibit positive duration dependence, while 
orderly exits exhibit negative duration dependence. Moreover, an increase in trade 
concentration lowers the chance of an orderly exit. Countries with a lower growth rate 
of foreign currency reserves and more incidences of banking crises are more likely to 
have crisis-driven exits. Finally, our findings show that degrees of capital-account 
liberalisation are positively related to the chance of an orderly exit.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data and 
variables used. Section 3 briefly reviews the methodology of the competing risks 
model. The estimation results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the 
paper.  
 
 
2. Data 
 
Our sample consists of monthly data for the peg duration and country-specific 
variables from 77 countries for the period from January 1972 to December 2001. As 
the actual exchange rate arrangements of countries might differ from the official 
announcements, we use the de facto classification method of Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2004), hereafter “RR”, to construct the sample of peg durations.2 In accordance with 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), we define an exit from a fixed exchange rate regime to a 
flexible one as a shift from any fixed categories to managed floating, freely floating or 
freely falling. Following Duttagupta and Otker-Robe (2003), a crisis-driven exit is 
identified if the end-of-month exchange rate movement is larger than two times the 
standard deviation of the monthly depreciation rate, i.e., 
 
 2t , 
 
where t  is the average monthly depreciation rate of nominal exchange rate at the 
time of regime shift (units of the national currency per U.S. dollar),   is the average 
of monthly depreciation rate during a given peg,   is the standard deviation of 
                                                 
2 Other de facto classifications include Shambaugh (2004). 
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monthly depreciation rate during the same period. The remaining exits are treated as 
orderly exits. The results of our crisis-driven classification are similar to those of 
Glick, Guo and Hutchison (2006). To provide a robustness check, we also follow the 
method of Detregiache et al. (2005) and Lin and Ye (2011) to define crisis-driven 
exits, and find that our results remain unchanged. 
 
The duration of an exchange rate peg is defined as the time spent on a peg. One 
hundred and thirty three duration observations are obtained from the sample; 82 
pegged durations end in or before December, 2001; and the remaining 51 
observations are right-censored. The definitions of variables and data descriptions are 
given in Tables 1 and 2 respectively.  
 
 
 
Table 1: Definition of Variables and Data Sources 
Variables Descriptions Data Sources 
OPENNESS 
Total gross exports and 
imports, percent of GDP 
IMF, International 
Financial Statistics 
CONCENTRATION 
Share of total exports to 3 
largest trading partners 
Ghosh, Gulde, and 
Wolf (2003) 
INFLATION 
Change in consumer prices, 
percent of per annum 
IMF, International 
Financial Statistics 
GDP_GROWTH 
Real GDP growth rate, 
percent of per annum 
World Economic 
Outlook 
GDP_VOLATILITY 
Deviation of real GDP 
from HP-filtered trend, 3-
year standard deviation 
Ghosh, Gulde, and 
Wolf (2003) 
BASEINTEREST 
Nominal interest rate in the 
base country 
IMF, International 
Financial Statistics 
CAL 
Capital-account 
Liberalization, Total gross 
actual foreign direct and 
portfolio investment, 
Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007) 
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percent of GDP 
CBI 
Turnover rate of central 
bank governors 
Ghosh, Gulde, and 
Wolf (2003) 
DEMOCRACY Index of democracy Freedom House 
DEBTPOSITION 
Net debt liability, percent 
of GDP 
Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007) 
RESERVEGROWTH 
Change in foreign 
exchange reserves, percent 
per annum 
IMF, International 
Financial Statistics 
HYPERINFLATION 
1 if inflation above 50%, 0 
otherwise 
IMF, International 
Financial Statistics 
BANKCRISIS 
1 if there is banking crisis, 
0 otherwise 
Ghosh, Gulde, and 
Wolf (2003) 
COUNTRYTYPE 
1 if Developed countries, 0 
otherwise 
World Bank 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics on Pegged Duration 
 Full Sample Crisis-driven Exit Orderly Exit 
Failed 82 30 52 
Censored 51   
Mean 131 128 71 
Median 105 110 56 
Stdev 111 93 65 
Min 3 11 3 
Max 360 311 323 
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Table 3 summarises the statistics of durations for the two types of exits. The average 
duration of a peg is 131 months, the median duration is 105 months and the range of a 
peg duration is from 3 months to 360 months. A total of 82 failed pegs are identified, 
of which 30 are crisis-driven exits and 52 are orderly exits. Furthermore, a pegged 
exchange rate regime lasts significantly longer in crisis-driven exits than in orderly 
exits. We apply an array of country-specific variables in our analysis. The data for 
these covariates are taken from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) and other 
sources, covering most determinants suggested by the literature on currency crises and 
optimal currency areas. The macroeconomic variables included are openness, trade 
concentration, domestic inflation rate, economic growth and output volatility. 
Financial variables include base-country interest rate,3 foreign debt, capital-account 
liberalisation, banking crises and central bank independence. Political and 
institutional variables include democratisation, country type and hyperinflation. Note 
that the traditional measures of capital-account liberalisation are based on the IMF’s 
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. These 
measures might not adequately reflect the actual or de facto exposure of countries to 
international capital markets. In this paper, we use the measure of capital-account 
liberalisation that focuses exclusively on portfolio equity and FDI holdings (Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti, 2007). 
 
 
3. Methodology 
 
We let the peg duration be a realisation of a random variable T , and the indicator of 
the type of exits a realisation of a random variable R . The hazard function for an exit 
of type r  (the cause-specific hazard) is defined as 
 
      dt
tTrRdttTt
h
dt
r ),Pr(lim
0
   .                                                                (1) 
 
                                                 
3 The base country is the one to which a country pegs its own currency (Di Giovanni and Shambaugh, 
2007). 
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Equation (2) captures the conditional probability that a peg will terminate at time 
tT   and type rR  , given that it has survived till time t . The probability that an 
exit of type r  occurs in the interval ),( dttt   is the event-specific density function: 
 
),()(),Pr(lim)(
0
tSth
dt
rRdttTttf r
dt
r                                                     (2) 
 
where )Pr()( tTtS  . 
 
For country i , let 
1
it  be the duration of a peg before an orderly exit and 
2
it  be the 
duration of a peg before a crisis-driven exit. The two types of exits are mutually 
exclusive. We define  
 
),( 21 iii ttMint  .  
 
Let ir  be an indicator variable, which equals to 0 under a pegged exchange rate 
system, equals to 1 if there is an orderly exit from a peg to a floating and equals to 2 if 
there is a crisis-driven exit. We observe an event or censoring time it  and a 
categorical variable ir  indicating whether they are censored. The data are censored if 
0ir and are uncensored if ri =1 or 2. Considering Cox PH models of the form: 
 
2,1],)(exp[)();( 0  rtxthxth rrr                                                                  (3) 
 
where both the baseline hazard ratios )(0 th
r
 and 
r  are specific to type r  hazard, x(t) 
is observed characteristics denoted by potential explanatory variables at time t and 
r
k
r
r
tt 1  denotes the rk  ordered failures of type r . The likelihood function for the 
Cox competing risks model is  
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where the risk set  rjtR  is the set of fixed exchange rate spells that are at risk of 
collapsing before the jth  failure of type r . State dependence might arise due to 
unobserved heterogeneity. To incorporate unobserved heterogeneity into our model,4 
the Cox CRM can be extended to include a multiplicative term v , i.e., 
 
2,1,])(exp[)();( 0  rvtxthxth rrrr  ,                                                            (5) 
 
where 
rv  is the destination-specific and unobserved individual effect. We assume that 
the unobserved heterogeneity is independent of observed characteristics and follows a 
Gamma distribution with unit mean and variance theta. In the proportional hazard 
CRM, the interpretation of the parameters is analogous to the Cox PH model. The 
marginal effect of a certain variable kx , on the chance of entering state r, is 
 
),(])(exp[)(/),( 0  xthtxthxxth rrkrkrrkr  .                                        (6) 
 
When 0rk , an increase in kx  will increase the probability of leaving the pegged 
exchange rate system for a certain destination state r  relative to the probability of 
staying with the peg. The proportional hazard competing risks model also allows us to 
compare the odds of each type of exits. If 
j
k
r
k    rj   then an increase in kx  will 
increase the conditional probability of exiting from route r . 
 
4. Results 
 
To examine the general distribution of exits, we begin with a preliminary model 
without explanatory variables and the standard nonparametric Kaplan-Meier 
                                                 
4 When unobserved heterogeneity is ignored, its impact is confounded with that of the baseline hazard, 
which might result in spurious regression. 
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estimators. Figures 1-3 present the estimated hazard functions for both types of exits 
from a pegged exchange rate system. The results for all exits show a mildly non-
monotonic pattern of duration dependence. However, crisis-driven exits exhibit 
positive duration dependence in general, while orderly exits exhibit negative duration 
dependence. The estimated survival functions in Figure 4 show that orderly exits are 
more likely to occur in the early stage of a peg than those of crisis-driven exits. 
 
 
Figures 1 to 4 about here 
 
  
The estimation results for the standard Cox CRM are reported in Table 4. The results 
for Cox CRM with unobserved heterogeneity are reported in Table 5.  
 
Table 4 about here 
 
Table 5 about here 
 
For both models, we control the country-specific time-varying explanatory variables. 
In the baseline Model (1), the selected variables include openness, trade concentration, 
inflation, output growth, output volatility, interest rate and capital-account 
liberalisation. Country-specific attributes are considered in models (2) to (5). 
      
Note, from Table 5, that 
2
v  is close to zero in all models, and we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis for  0
2 v . It is found that the main estimates are almost identical to 
those of the standard model. Furthermore, all the 
2
v  except for the orderly exit in 
model 3 are close to zero. Therefore, the heterogeneity problem is not severe. The 
coefficient for the degrees of openness is negative in all cases. It is a significant 
consideration for orderly exits, but insignificant for crisis-driven exits. An increase in 
openness greatly reduces the chance of an orderly exit, implying that the benefit of 
trade openness outweighs the cost of vulnerability to external shocks.  
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For the orderly exit, the coefficient for trade concentration is strongly negative in 
model (2). A high concentration of trade improves the linkage between the home and 
base countries, which in turn reduces the probability of an orderly exit. On the other 
hand, it will exacerbate a given misalignment and lead to a crisis-driven exit. 
Therefore, the crisis-driven exit coefficient is strongly positive in most models. The 
coefficient for the inflation rate is significantly positive for orderly exits but slightly 
negative for crisis-driven exits. A higher level of inflation in home country compared 
with that of the base country under the peg leads to overvaluation of the real exchange 
rate. Thus, abandoning the peg can result in a higher chance of an orderly exit and 
prove beneficial for a country’s sustainable development. The coefficient for the 
degrees of capital-account liberalisation is significantly positive for orderly exits but 
insignificant for the crisis-driven exits.5 For countries with liberalised capital accounts, 
the floating exchange rate arrangement provides a better insulation for output against 
shocks to aggregate demand. It also implies that an orderly exit cannot occur when 
capital control is still in place. 
 
 Note that the effect of economic growth (GDP_GROWTH) is negative but 
insignificant in all models. The coefficients for the volatility of output 
(GDP_VOLATILITY) and the interest rate of the base country are strongly positive 
for both exits in most models. High volatility in output might lead a country to adopt a 
flexible exchange rate system to avoid economic shocks, thereby reducing the 
probability of the peg’s survival. Increased interest rates of the base country 
accelerate capital outflows from the home country, forcing the abandonment of the 
peg. It is noteworthy that the estimated coefficient is larger for crisis-driven exits, 
suggesting that an increased interest rate in the base country will heighten the chance 
of a crisis-driven exit. Consequently, the peg requires the home country to follow the 
monetary policy of the base country. Such a policy might not be optimal6 and could 
potentially make the home economy more vulnerable to speculative attacks.7 
  
                                                 
5 Glick et al. (2006) suggest that countries with liberalised capital accounts might also have better 
economic fundamentals, which make them less vulnerable to currency crises. 
6 Miniane and Rogers (2007) find that local interest rates are more likely to follow base interest rates 
for pegs. 
7  Di Giovanni and Shambaugh (2007) find evidence that a high base-country interest rate has a 
contractionary effect on domestic economy, especially for the country with a fixed exchange rate. 
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Our findings are robust across models, except for model (2), where controlling the 
degree of central bank independence (CBI) generates a negative coefficient for the 
volatility of output in the orderly-exit case. Some important results are obtained. First, 
a high turnover of central bank governors (less central bank independence) induces a 
higher likelihood of an orderly exit. Second, we find that the conditional probability 
of an exit is not affected by the degree of democracy, hyperinflation or whether the 
country is developed or developing. Note that hyperinflation reduces the probability 
of leaving the pegged exchange system. The peg provides a potential nominal anchor 
for a central bank to achieve its inflation target. Third, rapid growth in foreign 
currency reserves can defend the peg and reduce the probability of crisis-driven exits 
(Chong et al., 2008). Also, note that the coefficient for the net debt position variable is 
strongly negative for orderly exits. Calvo and Reinhart (2002) point out that foreign 
debt is the main contributing factor for a country to peg its currency in order to avoid 
exchange rate volatility. Thus, a high level of foreign liabilities reduces the tendency 
towards adopting a floating regime. Finally, the incidence of banking crises 
significantly increases the chance of crisis-driven exits, whereas it has no apparent 
effect on orderly exits.  
 
After controlling the country-specific time-varying factors and unobserved 
heterogeneity (in model (1)), we retrieve the baseline hazard functions for both types 
of exits by Cox CRM. The smoothed versions of these functions are shown in Figures 
5 and 6. Note that the hazard functions remain relatively unaffected; in addition, 
crisis-driven exits exhibit positive duration dependence, while orderly exits are more 
likely to occur at an early stage of the peg.  
                              
 
Figures 5 to 6 about here 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
For many developing countries, the fixed exchange rate regime serves as a temporary 
policy measure to stabilise domestic inflation and provide an environment for steady 
economic growth. However, pegs might also constrain the choice of domestic 
monetary policies and make the domestic financial system vulnerable to speculative 
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attacks. This paper employs the competing risks model to investigate how a country’s 
attributes affect its choice of the exchange rate regime. Two types of exits from the 
pegged exchange rate regime, namely, the crisis-driven exit and the orderly exit, are 
investigated. The two types of exits are very different in nature and in policy 
implications. A crisis-driven exit often results in economic turbulence, while an 
orderly exit is relatively tranquil. A competing risks model with time-varying 
explanatory variables is estimated to uncover the way that the peg duration affects the 
likelihoods of crisis-driven and orderly exits. The baseline hazard ratio estimated by 
Cox CRM reveals that crisis-driven exits exhibit positive duration dependence, while 
orderly exits exhibit negative duration dependence after controlling country-specific 
time-varying factors and unobserved heterogeneity. Second, it is found that countries 
with higher degrees of openness and trade concentration have a lower chance of 
orderly exits. Third, it is shown that capital-account liberalisation increases the chance 
of orderly exits, while it has no apparent effect on the likelihood of crisis-driven exits. 
Last but not least, it is found that the likelihood of crisis-driven exits increases with 
the incidences of banking crises. 
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Figure 1: Estimated hazard function for all types of exits 
 
 
Figure 2: Estimated hazard function for crisis-driven exits 
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Figure 3: Estimated hazard function for orderly exits 
 
 
Figure 4: Estimated survival functions 
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Figure 5 Estimated Cox hazard function for Crisis-driven exits 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Estimated Cox hazard function for Orderly exits 
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Table 2: Nature of Exits 
 
Country Period of Exits Duration of Pegged Regime Nature of Exits 
Argentina 1981:03 36 Orderly exit 
 1986:04 10 Orderly exit 
 2001:12 128 Crisis-driven exit 
Armenia  73 Non-exit 
Australia 1982:11 130 Orderly exit 
Austria  360 Non-exit 
Belgium  360 Non-exit 
Bolivia  180 Non-exit 
Brazil 1975:04 39 Orderly exit 
 1986:09 6 Orderly exit 
 1989:04 3 Orderly exit 
 1999:02 55 Orderly exit 
Bulgaria  60 Non-exit
Canada  360 Non-exit 
Chile 1982:06 52 Crisis-driven exit 
 1999:09 140 Orderly exit 
China 1981:03 86 Orderly exit 
  113 Non-exit 
Colombia 1983:10 141 Orderly exit 
 1999:10 178 Orderly exit 
Costa Rica 1980:10 105 Crisis-driven exit 
  218 Non-exit 
Cyprus  360 Non-exit 
Czech Rep 1997:06 81 Crisis-driven exit 
Denmark  360 Non-exit 
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Dominica  360 Non-exit 
Dominican Rep 1982:09 128 Orderly exit 
 1987:07 19 Crisis-driven exit 
  110 Non-exit
Ecuador 1982:03 108 Orderly exit 
 1997:10 48 Orderly exit 
  22 Non-exit 
Egypt  360 Non-exit
El Salvador 1982:08 127 Orderly exit 
  141 Non-exit
Estonia  114 Non-exit 
Finland 1992:09 248 Crisis-driven exit 
  107 Non-exit 
France 1974:04 27 Orderly exit 
  330 Non-exit 
Germany 1973:01 12 Orderly exit 
  36 Non-exit 
Greece 1981:07 114 Crisis-driven exit 
  208 Non-exit 
Guatemala 1984:12 155 Orderly-exit 
 1989:06 11 Crisis-driven exit 
  128 Non-exit
Guyana 1987:02 181 Crisis-driven exit 
  84 Non-exit
Haiti 1991:10 237 Crisis-driven exit 
 1993:05 13 Orderly-exit 
Honduras 1990:03 218 Crisis-driven exit 
  129 Non-exit
Hong Kong  360 Non-exit 
Hungary  360 Non-exit 
Iceland 1973:05 16 Orderly-exit 
 1977:05 15 Orderly-exit 
 2000:10 196 Orderly-exit 
India 1979:03 86 Orderly-exit 
  269 Non-exit 
Indonesia 1972:07 6 Orderly-exit 
 1997:08 277 Crisis-driven exit 
Iran 1977:01 60 Orderly-exit 
Iraq 1982:01 120 Orderly-exit 
Ireland  360 Non-exit
Israel 1986:09 11 Orderly-exit 
  180 Non-exit
Italy 1975:10 45 Orderly-exit 
 1992:09 116 Crisis-driven exit 
  105 Non-exit 
Jamaica 1978:01 72 Crisis-driven exit 
 1990:10 137 Orderly-exit 
  108 Non-exit
 20
Japan 1977:12 71 Orderly-exit 
Jordan 1988:10 201 Crisis-driven exit 
  152 Non-exit 
Korea 1997:12 311 Crisis-driven exit 
Lao 1973:04 15 Orderly-exit 
 1997:01 79 Crisis-driven exit 
Latvia  95 Non-exit 
Lebanon 1984:03 146 Orderly-exit 
  125 Non-exit 
Lithuania  81 Non-exit
Malaysia 1997:08 307 Crisis-driven exit 
  39 Non-exit 
Mexico 1976:09 56 Crisis-driven exit 
 1982:02 59 Crisis-driven exit 
 1995:01 73 Crisis-driven exit 
Moldova 1998:06 39 Crisis-driven exit 
  22 Non-exit 
Myanmar 1974:07 30 Orderly-exit 
 1983:05 86 Orderly-exit 
 1988:04 24 Orderly-exit 
 1993:01 19 Orderly-exit 
 1996:08 30 Orderly-exit 
Netherlands  360 Non-exit 
New Zealand 1985:03 158 Crisis-driven exit 
Nicaragua 1974:04 87 Non-exit 
  128 Orderly-exit 
Norway 1982:07 126 Crisis-driven exit 
 1992:12 65 Crisis-driven exit 
Pakistan  360 Non-exit 
Panama  360 Non-exit 
Paraguay 1981:09 116 Orderly-exit 
 1989:03 34 Crisis-driven exit 
  131 Non-exit 
Peru  98 Non-exit 
Philippines 1983:10 141 Crisis-driven exit 
 1997:07 128 Crisis-driven exit 
Poland 1991:06 17 Orderly-exit 
 2000:04 58 Orderly-exit 
Portugal  360 Non-exit 
Romania  9 Non-exit
Russia  25 Non-exit 
Singapore 1998:12 323 Orderly-exit 
Slovak Rep 1998:10 66 Orderly-exit 
Slovenia  105 Non-exit
South Africa 1972:11 10 Orderly-exit 
Spain  360 Non-exit
Sweden 1992:12 251 Crisis-driven exit 
Switzerland 1973:12 13 Orderly-exit 
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  244 Non-exit 
Thailand 1997:07 306 Crisis-driven exit 
Turkey 1976:09 56 Orderly-exit 
 2001:02 36 Crisis-driven exit 
UK 1972:07 6 Orderly-exit 
 1992:09 23 Crisis-driven exit 
US 1978:02 60 Orderly-exit 
Ukraine  39 Non-exit
Uruguay 1982:12 49 Crisis-driven exit 
 1991:12 12 Orderly-exit 
  75 Non-exit 
Venezuela 1983:03 134 Orderly-exit 
  66 Non-exit 
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Table 4: Estimation Results for Cox Model 
Risk Coefficient  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Risk 1 Risk 2 Risk 1 Risk 2 Risk 1 Risk 2 Risk 1 Risk 2 Risk 1 Risk 2 
40  29  34  26  36  28  36  29  37  29  
OPENNESS -2.767*** -0.411 -1.372* -0.321 -1.792** -0.251 -3.203*** -0.25 -3.343*** -0.459 
CONCENTRATION -0.014 0.021* -0.019* 0.018 -0.012 0.021* -0.012 0.020* -0.009 0.024*
INFLATION 0.431*** -1.131 0.481*** -4.821 0.454*** -3.093 0.565*** -1.182 0.475*** -1.922 
GDP_GROWTH -1.397 -1.323 -0.155 -1.792 -1.056 -1.162 0.711 -0.993 -0.109 -1.343 
GDP_VOLATILITY 11.293* 12.725** -0.208 13.558** 9.58 13.448** 15.601** 12.950** 15.678** 9.724* 
BASEINTEREST 15.643*** 22.927*** 14.254** 33.794*** 18.273*** 32.244*** 13.375** 21.416*** 14.399** 21.141*** 
CAL 1.381*** -0.619 1.201** -0.597 1.460** -0.681 1.288** -0.653 1.383** -0.646
CBI   1.624*** 0.755       
COUNTRYTYPE   0.235 -0.146       
DEMOCRACY     -0.133 -0.019     
DEBTPOSITION     -0.811* -0.117     
RESERVEGROWTH       -0.850* -1.009**   
HYPERINFLATION       -1.267 -0.392 -1.279 -0.629 
BANKCRISIS         -0.056 0.989** 
ln L -240.82 -194.32 -213.71 -215.38 -217.97 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, Risk 1 for orderly exits, Risk 2 for crisis-driven exits. 
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 Table 5:  Estimation Results for Cox Model With Gamma Heterogeneity 
Risk Coefficient  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Risk 1 Risk 2 Risk 1 Risk 2 Risk 1 Risk 2 Risk 1 Risk 2 Risk 1 Risk 2 
40  29  34  26  36  28  36  29  37  29  
OPENNESS -2.780*** -0.411 -1.381* -0.321 -1.586** -0.251 -3.120*** -0.25 -3.265*** -0.459 
CONCENTRATION -0.014 0.021* -0.019* 0.018 -0.018 0.021* -0.016 0.020* -0.013 0.024* 
INFLATION 0.430*** -1.131 0.478*** -4.821 0.421*** -3.093 0.553*** -1.182 0.460*** -1.922 
GDP_GROWTH -1.359 -1.323 -0.119 -1.792 -1.533 -1.162 0.597 -0.993 -0.347 -1.343 
GDP_VOLATILITY 11.374* 12.725** -0.019 13.558** 9.251 13.448** 15.260** 12.950** 15.293** 9.724* 
BASEINTEREST 15.860*** 22.93*** 14.270** 33.794*** 18.856*** 32.244*** 13.477** 21.416*** 14.595** 21.141***
CAL 1.369*** -0.619 1.200** -0.597 1.376** -0.681 1.283** -0.653 1.393** -0.646 
CBI   1.635*** 0.755       
COUNTRYTYPE   0.236 -0.146       
DEMOCRACY     -0.189 -0.019     
DEBTPOSITION     -0.803* -0.117     
RESERVEGROWTH       -0.863* -1.009**   
HYPERINFLATION       -1.396 -0.392 -1.426 -0.629 
BANKCRISIS         -0.062 0.989** 
2
v  1.36e-15 2.11e-16 1.27e-14 7.00e-19 0.152 2.11e-16 0.061 2.08e-18 0.071 1.27e-14 
ln L -240.57 -194.20 -213.21 -214.97 -217.58 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, Risk 1 for orderly exits, Risk 2 for crisis-driven exits. 
